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Abstract 
 
The effort in advanced information sy stem  that many organizations have
achieved  to improve performance under foreseeable  situations  has
increased organizational complexity decreasing the capacity to deal with
unforeseen situations. At this respect, our  research question is: what is the 
limit  for  this  model  of devel opment?  Once reached, what   are t he
alternatives to improve? An explanation can be organized around semiotic.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we analy ze the effort that many  organizations have developed related to 
the design of the technical and structural mechanisms to improve performance of work 
processes.  However, improvement in rules and  procedures  seems  to  backfire  when 
unknown problems arise that become a barrier to the solution. Every new rule or device 
can be a good way to manage a planned event (Reason, 1997) but,  at the same time the 
reaction to an unplanned one can be impeded.  
 
As a result, the pace of improvement of many  organizations has stopped or decreased. 
The  technology-based  development  generates  new events throug h  unexpected 
interactions  among  parts  of  the sy stem.  Consequently,  this kind of development 
decreases the capacity of the system to manage these new events. An explanation to this 
issue can be organized around semiotics related concepts. The concept of having to look 
for ways to improve from the present situation is especially relevant. 
 
In order to study this phenomenon, we proceed as follows: I n the first epig raph, we 
analyze briefly the evolution of information technolog ies and the effects produced  in 
organizations, especially human operators’ capacity. Next, we study this situation in a 
specific  industry,  aerial transportation, focusing our interest on safety  related issues. 





Information  and communication technologies together with detailed procedures have 
become an essential piece for organizational evolution in recent years. From this point 
of view, an evolving system acts as a machine that requires information gathering and 
processing  and  reflects  an  external  reality  as  closely  as  possible.  To  get  these 
representations  information technolog ies  have been very   useful. At this respect, the 
definition from Varela (1988) of a computer as a device that manag es symbols but only 
handles  its phy sical  shape and not its  sense  is  relevant.  This  characteristic  of 
information technologies causes a lack of capacity  of systems to manage unforeseen 
events; therefore, those events should require human operators.  However, information 
systems design is complex enough to make them opaque for their operators who, in 
many situations, do not understand the principles of its functioning.  
 
Winograd and Flores (1987) show that “opacity  of implementation is one of the key  
intellectual contributions of computer science” since every level of design can become 
independent from the one below, keeping  its own log ic. This issue is different in the 
construction of a mechanical system. The mechanical system is more complicated since 
every  level  of  design  has  to be   justified  by  the  one  below.  That  means  that  in 
circumstances where the required knowledge is present,  a mechanical sy stem can trace 
a  contingency  until  its  origin.  This doe s  not ha ppen  in a   information  system.   The  
opacity  of  implementation  of i nformation  systems  breaks t he  logical  chain  among 
different levels of design. The hardware designer, the software designer and the operator 
live apart and they can become experts in their fields having no idea about the others’ 
fields since they have become functionally independent. 
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When  everything  happens  as  planned, this blind-to-meaning   model works fine; 
however, in opposite situations where unplanned conting ency appears, the feasibility of 
dealing with it is decreased compared to the old mechanical sy stems. Reason (1997) 
explains this fact under his “SRK” model where “S” stands for Skills, “R” for Rules and 
“K” for Knowledge. Each character represents a level. The Skills Level is the basic and 
the  Knowledge  Level  is  the  top  in  this mode l.  An opa que  system  only  allows  its 
operators to reach the Rules Level since the opacity of its design makes it impossible for 
the operators to get the Knowledge Level. 
 
That happens because operators cannot access to the meaning  of their actions. I n the 
field of Knowledge Management, Choo and B ontis (2002) introduced  the concepts of 
meaning  and  sensemaking  as  important  issues  for the improvement and learning   in 
organizations. In the field of Org anisational Semiotics, Gazendam (2001) explains the 
importance of active exploration as a key to build a world model that allows its author 
to manage it. If the design of the system impedes that active exploration and, therefore, 
the access to meaning of the activity, the introduction of new features to a system could 
transfer  capacities  from  the  operators  to the   technical  part  of  the  system  instead  of 
adding new capacities. 
 
The loss of meaning makes the human operator to act under the Skill L evel and Rules 
Level instead of using the Knowledge Level (Reason, 1997). Every new added feature 
could reinforce this process. Therefore, t he real improvement -from a whole system 
scope- should be lower than ex pected since increases in technical capacity  go together 
with decreases in human capacity : The technical model  of development not only adds 
capacity to the system but also extracts capacity from one of its components transferring 
it to the other one. The ex pected effect should be drawn of this  model of development: 
The capacities of the system that can be performed by technology are increased and the 
capacities  that  cannot  be  performed  by  technology  but by   its human operators are 
decreased. 
 
Since  information technolog ies  do not have access to  the  meaning  but  to  symbols 
(Varela, 1988), those activities requiring access to meaning –those events representing 
exceptions to the general rule and not included in the system design- could have serious 
limitations  to  be performed. B y  the other side, actions than can be included in the 
system design can be performed efficiently, decreasing like that the number of errors. 
 
Some industries, as aerial transportation, are risky  enough to accept this development 
model. The improvement of many activities is decreasing performance in a few of them. 
If these few activities could drive to situations, important in terms of human or material 
losses, the basis of this model of development should be re-examined. 
 
In the next epigraph, aerial safety is going to be analyzed in order to show how the se 
effects happen even in industries that can exhibit a high improvement rate. 
 
The case of aerial safety 
 
Results  in  aerial  safety  show  a successful ex ample  about the feasibility   of a real 
improvement in very complex organizations. The figure (Boeing, 2002) illustrates  the 
evolution of safety until the present moment: 
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It  is especially   interesting  to observe that since 1975 the improvement rate has 
decreased. That happened in the presence of an important  technological evolution in the 
aerial  field. I f  one of the factors to improve the behavior of the  system  has  been 
technology and the results show a decreasing  rate of improvement, another different 
factor should be responsible for that decreasing rate. 
 
Reason (1990) identifies this factor by explaining that we can produce a new accident 
trying  to a void  the  last  one.  In  other  words,  limiting  the  freedom  to a ct  of  human 
operators can avoid mistakes but, at the same time, can impede necessary actions. In a 
complex  environment,  there  are cont ingencies  where necessary   actions  could  be 
unplanned; therefore, these actions should be  unforeseeable and unmanageable by the 
design of the organization. 
 
If human operators are allowed to act but they are part of a system that they do not fully 
understand, the feasibility to act is more theoretical than real since operators  could not 
know how to act. The development of  information technologies in aviation shows how 
this can happen: An old aircraft had many indicators requiring a human operator to g et 
the whole picture from multiple data sources; a new aircraft is very different, having a 
few multifunctional screens and giving information that the own system has integrated 
before. The new Boeing 747 generation has about one third of the indicators that the old 
Boeing 747 generation had; even more, the flig ht engineer is not  required anymore in 
the new flightdeck. 
 IE Working Paper                                   DO8-117-I                                26 / 04 / 2004 
  4  
Information technology has allowed an important improvement in the aerial  industry: 
Automated flightdecks can be managed by less people and, at the same time, common 
flightdeck designs for different planes allow some crews to fly different planes with a 
very short time of adaptation (Airbus, 2002). Furthermore, since automation can prevent 
human mistakes in previously defined situations, actions can  be performed near to the 
limits without the dang er of surpassing them. Aircraft manufacturers can  design fuel-
efficient planes even when its design makes a plane unstable since automatic systems 
should impede dangerous situations. 
 
The  positive contribution of information technolog ies  in aviation is  its  character  of 
efficiency-booster. They can provide efficiency  through design improvement, payroll 
reductions and training cost reductions due to its simpler interfaces. The not-so-g ood 
part is related to the new role of human operators and their accessibility  to the real 
meaning of their actions. 
 
Some accidents in new planes have shown very  clearly this effect: Once the operator 
has adopted a passive attitude and thinks that “the sy stem never fails”, he  becomes 
useless  in  situations that ex ceed  the sy stem  capabilities –precisely   those that could 
justify his/her presence in the flightdeck-. 
 
Accidents like AeroPeru 603 or American Airlines 965 (W alters & Sumwalt, 2000), 
both in technologically advanced planes, can only  be explained through an accepted 
passive role related to the information system. Once the information system started to 
give confusing indications, the operators could not take the right actions. 
 
Both situations could have happened in old planes. The accident of AeroPeru happened 
because of a piece of tape that someone forgot in the outside part of the plane, giving 
false  speed and hei ght  indications;  the  accident  of Am erican  Airlines  was  due  to  a 
confusion  with radio-frequencies. However, if we think about procedures in an old 
plane, probably, none of these accidents should have happened: 
 
•  AeroPeru  603: The situation of bad indications  is  analyzed  even  for  lower 
licenses like glider and private pilot licenses.  Any pilot knows that the solution 
to this problem is breaking the glass of the instrument –in the case of a  plane 
with pressure cabin; they have to put the  outside pressure too-. If these pilots 
didn’t do that, the explanation could be easy : They never could think in their 
plane as an usual plane and were looking  for an explanation in the information 
system part. Even when they started to work with basic instruments –outside the 
information system- getting the same bad indications, they never had the frame 
of mind of a glider pilot or a Cessna pilot under the same situation. 
 
•  American Airlines 965: The confusion between two radio-stations with the same 
frequency made the pilots g etting lost in a hig h-mountain area. If, instead of  a 
multifunctional screen with a keyboard, they would have a paper-made map, 
probably, they should not get confused and, if so, they could quickly correct the 
mistake. 
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Information  technology  designers  have trade meaning   for  legibility  and  pay  special 
attention  to g et  inputs and outputs with visual  representations  familiar  to  operators 
coming from older systems. In this way, operators can get friendly interfaces and use to 
think  that a new plane is similar to an old one. L ikewise, the independence among  
design levels in information sy stems (Winograd & Flores, 1987) makes the transition 
from one plane to another easy. Different kind of planes can share identical flightdecks 
(Campos, 2001). 
  
This kind of solution increases the complexity of the system, since it gives the operators 
an image about how the sy stem supposedly works but that imag e is an output of the 
system  and  not  the  way  internally  used to perform its functions. The puz zlement 
between both modes –the real (logical mode) and the output received by the operator 
(operational mode)- gets the operator confused when a situation shows  clearly the next 
fact: The operator has been using the operational model “as if” it was coincident to the 
logic model. In critical situations, this operator has to learn that this is not true.  
 
Consequently, the expert operator becomes conscious  of this fallacy through different 
microevents where the output of the information sy stem does not work as  expected. 
Baberg  (2001) ex plains  this fact throug h  a very   common joke among   pilots: 
Supposedly, the most common sentence spoken in a modern flig htdeck is: “What is 
doing now this bastard?” referred to the plane. Therefore, the operator learns to distrust 
the  system  –actually,  its desig n  is based on g iving  the operator the  information 
supposedly required and nothing  more- and g ets confused and  powerless if something 
happens making evident the contradiction between the operational and the logical mode. 
 
Dennett (1996) uses two metaphors to illustrate the contradiction between these modes. 
Dennett  opposes the model of an information ag ency  to the model of a commando 
group. In the first model, the operator knows only  the information required to perform 
the specific task. In the second model, the whole information about situation is given to 
operators  since  unknown  events are ex pected  and operators can be demanded to 
confront them. 
 
The increasing complexity of organizations has driven to situations where operators are 
managed under the “information ag ency” model; consequently, they only receive the 
operational model since the logical model should be very complex to understand. 
 
The key issue should be as follows: W hich are the  conditions that could convert the 
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CONCLUSIONS: NEW CHALLENGES 
 
The case shown in this paper is not an ex ception. Many organizations use advanced 
information systems and operators are given an operational model but not a logical one. 
In  situations where serious conting encies  are not ex pected,  limiting  the  knowledge 
required  to operators can be an efficient way   to act. However,  this  model  has  an 
important  flaw when conting encies  are frequent  and/or  important.  The  kind  of 
development  that  can provide efficiency   to the org anization  can prevent human 
operators to become an alternative resource under unknown events. 
 
Operators do not learn better the behavior of the system through their activity because 
of the incomplete knowledge they have received to perform their tasks.  Learning other 
design  levels  of  the  system  could  be  very  far from their training   and ex perience. 
Consequently,  the evolution drives the sy stem  far bey ond  from  the  understanding 
capacity of the operator. 
 
Therefore,  operators provided with incomplete knowledg e  do  not  represent  a  good 
solution,  especially  in those fields where contingencies can be seri ous. At the same 
time, training and experience of these operators do not qualify them to reach a deeper 
understanding of increasingly complex systems. That draws a dilemma hard to escape. 
 
The  next  challenge  to  be faced by   engineers  is  related  to  this  dilemma:  Since  full 
understanding of the systems by operators is difficult, time-consuming  and expensive, 
the requirement for simpler systems is hard to meet. That is especially in those systems 
that deal with high-risk activities. The reasonable limit for technolog ical design should 
not come from technological potential but from the level of complex ity where human 
operators start becoming unable to execute their role as an alternative to the system.  
 
This solution goes far beyond ergonomic issues and the idea of g etting interfaces as 
easy  as possi ble.  The real   issue  is  in  the  organizational  semiotics  field  and  the 
transparency  requirement,  especially  in hig h-risk  activities.  New  programming 
languages  and  new log ical  models are required to make sy stems  meaningful  to 
operators. 
 
Rassmussen (1986) pointed out a requirement for information system designs: They had 
to be cognitively run by their human operators. In this way, these operators can be able 
to know at any moment the real state of the system. This requirement has been far to be 
met  by  the new technolog y  developments. The independence among   design  levels 
(Winograd & Flores, 1986) has some advantag es and the temptation to g et the most 
from  the  information  system  is  always  present.  However, t he  existence  of  different 
modes –logical and operating- has to be avoided. The “as-if” way, dismissing the access 
of the operators to the meaning of their actions is not enough in high-risk environments. 
That  means  working  with  the  logical  model  of t he  systems  and  keeping  it  easy  to 
understand for its operators.  Making easier that logical model instead of hiding it is the 
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